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Abstract
We analyze the incentives of a telecommunications incumbent to invest and give access
to a downstream entrant to a next generation network, NGN. We model the industry
as a duopoly, where a vertically integrated incumbent and a downstream entrant,
that requires access to the incumbents network, compete on Hotellings line. The
incumbent can invest in the deployment of a NGN that improves the quality of the
retail services. Access to the old network is regulated, but access to the NGN is not.
If the innovation is drastic, the incumbent always invests in the NGN, but does not
give access to the entrant. If the innovation is non-drastic and if the access price to
the old network is low, the incumbent voluntarily gives access to the NGN. If the
innovation is non-drastic, there is no monotonic relation between the access price to
the old network and the incumbents incentives to invest. A regulatory moratorium
emerges as socially optimal, if the innovation is large but non-drastic. We also analyze
the case where both rms can invest in the deployment of a NGN.
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1 Introduction
The deployment of next generation networks, NGNs, leading to a multi-service network
for audio, video, and data services, sets the telecommunications sector on the verge of a new
era.1 In order to give rms the right incentives to invest, and to promote an e¢ cient use
of these infrastructures, sectorial regulators must set an adequate regulatory framework for
these new telecommunications networks.
Sectoral regulators are considering three main regulatory approaches:
(i) The Continuity approach: This approach consists of maintaining the current regu-
latory system. Accordingly, the review of the market analysis follows the course already
established, with the recourse to regulatory instruments in force and, presumably, with a
substantial conrmation of the main regulatory measures in place.
(ii) The Forbearance approach: This approach consists of the abstention from regula-
tory intervention with regard to broadband networks. The absence of intervention may be
permanent or temporary.
(iii) The Equality of Access approach: This approach consists on the enforcement of the
principle of equality of accessto NGNs, and the principle of equivalence of inputto the
incumbents wholesale o¤er, with a concurring progressive liberalization of the retail o¤ers.
In this article, we analyze, in the context of the forbearance approach, the incentives of a
telecommunications incumbent to: (i) invest in a NGN, and (ii) give access to the network
to a downstream entrant.
We model the telecommunications industry as a di¤erentiated products duopoly, where
an incumbent and an entrant compete on Hotellings line (Hotelling, 1929). The incumbent
is a vertically integrated rm that owns a network, and operates on the retail market. The
entrant operates on the retail market, and requires access to the incumbents network. The
incumbent can invest in the deployment of a NGN that improves the quality of the retail
services. Access to the old network is regulated, but access to the new network is not.2
In this context, conceding access to the NGN amounts to allowing the entrant to increase
the quality of its product, and has two opposing e¤ects on the incumbents prot. First,
it has the negative e¤ect of reducing the retail prots of the incumbent: the retail e¤ect.
1A Next Generation Network is a "(...) packet-based network able to provide telecommunication services
and able to make use of multiple broadband, QoS-enabled transport technologies and in which service-related
functions are independent from underlying transport related technologies." See ITU (2001).
2Not regulating the new network corresponds, e.g., to the case of the US, where Verizon is deploying a
next generation network, but is only obliged to o¤er to entrants wholesale services equivalent to those it
already o¤ered through the old network.
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Second, it has the positive e¤ect of increasing the wholesale prots of the incumbent: the
wholesale e¤ect. To understand this last e¤ect note that, if the entrant uses the NGN,
it produces a higher quality product, and thereby earns higher prots. This allows the
incumbent to charge a higher access price, which increases wholesale prots.
We distinguish two cases: (i) the quality improvement generated by the investment is
large   drastic innovation, and (ii) the quality improvement generated by the investment is
small   non-drastic innovation. In the latter case, the entrant, using the old network, can
compete against the incumbent, using the new network, if the access price is low enough.
In the former case it cannot, even if the access price equals marginal cost.
If the innovation is drastic, the incumbent always invests in the NGN, but does not give
access to the entrant, which is forced out of the market.
If the innovation is non-drastic, the regulator can control, through the regulation of the
old network, whether the incumbent: (i) invests in a NGN, and (ii) gives access to the
NGN.
If the access price to the old network is low, the wholesale prots on the old network are
small, and therefore the wholesale e¤ect dominates the retail e¤ect. Thus, if the innovation
is non-drastic and if the access price to the old network is low, the incumbent voluntarily
gives access to the NGN. In this case, an increase in the access price to the old network
decreases the incremental prot from investment, because it raises the incumbents prot
without investment. If the access price to the old network is high, the entrant exits the
market after investment. Since the incumbent faces no competition, the incremental prot
from the investment increases. Thus, if the innovation is non-drastic, there is no monotonic
relation between the access price to the old network and the incumbents incentives to invest.
Interestingly, a regulatory moratorium emerges as socially optimal, if the innovation is
non-drastic, but large.
We also analyze the case where both rms can invest in the deployment of a NGN. If
the investment cost is small, the possibility of both rms deploying a NGN may increase or
decrease welfare, compared with the case where only the incumbent can invest. If the invest-
ment cost is large, the possibility of both rms investing never increases welfare, although
this does not result from a duplication of the investment cost.
The academic literature on regulation only recently started to address the relation be-
tween access pricing and investment. Guthrie (2006) surveys the recent literature on the
relationship between infrastructure investment and the di¤erent regulatory regimes. He
concludes that much remains to be done. Valletti (2003) argues that it is important that
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regulatory policies are designed in a way that enables regulators to commit to rules over a
reasonable time period. Regulators should try to stabilize their policies to signal to rms
that they can commit to their decisions.
Gans (2001) analyzes an investment timing game where two rms compete to invest in
a new technology, but there is only one investment. In this case the regulator can induce
the leader to invest at the socially optimal date through the use of the access price. This is
a consequence of the preemption e¤ect, typical of the investment race literature. Gans and
King (2004) study the impact of access regulation on the timing of infrastructure investment,
when there is uncertainty about the investment returns. This article suggests the use of a
regulatory moratorium when the regulator has commitment problems. Vareda and Hoernig
(2007) study the investment of two operators in new infrastructures, which allows them to
o¤er new services, and show that a regulatory moratorium may be a necessary tool to give
the leader the correct incentives to invest, at the same time that allows to charge a lower
access price later on, in order to delay the followers investment. Vareda (2007) studies the
incumbents incentives to invest in quality upgrades and cost reduction when the regulator
forces it to unbundle its network. Foros (2004) shows that under some conditions the
investment by an incumbent in the quality of its network is lower with price regulation since
the access price is set equal to marginal cost. Kotakorpi (2006) considers a model with
vertical di¤erentiation, and obtains similar results. Brito et al. (2008) analyze if two-part
access tari¤s solve the dynamic consistency problem of the regulation of NGNs. Caillaud
and Tirole (2004) analyze the funding of an infrastructure when an incumbent has private
information about the protability of the investment and the regulator does not have access
to taxpayersmoney.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. We describe the model in Section
2. In Section 3, we characterize the equilibrium of the game. In Section 4, we discuss an
extension. Finally, in Section 5, we conclude. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Model
2.1 Environment
Consider a telecommunications industry where two rms, the incumbent and the entrant,
sell horizontally di¤erentiated products. The incumbent, rm i, is a vertically integrated rm
that owns a bottleneck input, to which we refer to as the old network. The old network,
network o, is a telephone network with a local access network based on the twisted pair of
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copper wire. The incumbent can make an investment to deploy a next generation network.
The next generation network is also a bottleneck input that allows the supply of retail
products of a higher quality than those supplied through the old network. We refer to the
next generation network as the new network, or network n. The entrant, rm e, only operates
in the retail market, and has to buy access to the network of the incumbent. We index rms
with subscript j = i; e, and networks with subscript v = o; n. There is a third party in the
industry, the sectoral regulator. Even if the new network is deployed, the incumbent must
o¤er access to the old network at a regulated access price. Access to the new network is not
mandatory. However, the incumbent may voluntarily sell access to the entrant. Costs and
demand are common knowledge.
The game has ve stages which unfold as follows. In stage 1, the sectoral regulator sets
the access price to the old network. In stage 2, the incumbent makes an investment decision.
In stage 3, if investment took place, the incumbent o¤ers the entrant an access price to the
new network. In stage 4, the entrant chooses which network it will use, if any. In stage 5,
the incumbent and the entrant compete on retail tari¤s.
2.2 Sectoral Regulator
The regulator sets the per unit access price of telecommunication services the entrant
must pay to incumbent to have access to old network, the access price, denoted by o on
[0;+1).3
The regulator maximizes social welfare, i.e., the sum of the rmsprots and the con-
sumer surplus, denoted by W .
2.3 Consumers
There is a large number of consumers, formally a continuum, whose measure we normalize
to 1. Consumers are uniformly distributed along a Hotelling line segment of length 1, facing
transportation costs tx to travel distance x, with t on (0;+1). Consumers are otherwise
homogeneous. As in Biglaiser and DeGraba (2001), we assume each consumer has a demand
function for telecommunications services given by yj = (z +v) pj, where yj on (0; z +v)
is the number of units of telecommunication services purchased from rm j, pj on (0; z +v)
is the per unit price of telecommunication services of rm j, z is a parameter on
 
4
3
p
6t;+1,
and v is a parameter that takes value 0 for products supplied through the old network, i.e.,
3Regulating telecommunications markets by intervening at the wholesale level, namely by setting access
prices, corresponds to the current EU and US practice.
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for v = o, and takes value z on (0;+1) for products supplied through the new network,
i.e., for v = n.4 This means that consumers are willing to pay a premium for services
delivered over the new network. The lower limit on z implies that all consumers have a
positive surplus under the di¤erent market structures.
Let  := z (2z +z). For pj = 0, the incremental consumer surplus from the invest-
ment is 1
2
. We take  as a measure of quality improvement enabled by the next generation
network.
2.4 Firms
The incumbent produces an input that: (i) uses in the production of a retail product,
or (ii) sells to the entrant.
The incumbent is located at point 0 and the entrant at point 1 of the line segment where
consumers are distributed.
Firms charge consumers two-part retail tari¤s, denoted by Tj(yj) = Fj + pjyj, j = i; e;
where Fj on [0;+1) is the xed part of rm j.
The incumbent can invest in a new network at a xed cost of I. We assume that I
belongs to
 
0; 1
2


. The upper limit on I ensures that the investment on a new network is
socially optimal. In Section 4 we allow both rms to invest.
Regarding the quality improvement enabled by the new network, we distinguish two
cases: (i) if z is on
p
z2 + 6t  z;+1, we say that the investment generates a drastic
innovation; (ii) if z is on

0;
p
z2 + 6t  z, we say that the investment generates a non-
drastic innovation. For notational convenience we use the equivalent condition that  is on
[6t;+1) for drastic innovation, and that  is on [0; 6t) for non-drastic innovation.
All of the incumbents marginal costs are constant and equal to zero. The entrant has
marginal cost v on fo; ng, which corresponds to the unit price paid for access to the old
or new network.
Given (o; n), the entrant can either: (i) accept o¤er n, and use the new network, (ii)
accept o¤er o, and use the old network, or (iii) reject n and o, and exit the market.
Denote by Dj, the demand, in terms of consumers, for rm j = i; e. The prots of rm
4Units of telecommunication services could be, e.g., minutes of communication or megabits.
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j = i; e for the whole game are:5
i = [pi (z +v   pi) + Fi]Di + v (z +v   pe)De   v
z
I; (1)
e = [(pe   v) (z +v   pe) + Fe]De: (2)
2.5 Equilibrium Concept
The sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium is: (i) a regulated access tari¤ for the old tech-
nology, (ii) an investment decision, (iii) an access price for the new network, (iv) a decision
of which network to use, and (v) a set of retail tari¤s, such that:
(E1) the retail tari¤s maximize the rmsprots, given the access tari¤s, the investment
decision and the entry decision;
(E2) the entry decision maximizes the entrants prots, given the access tari¤s, the incum-
bents investment decision, and the optimal retail tari¤s function;
(E3) the access tari¤ for the new network maximizes the incumbents prots, given the
access tari¤ for the old network, the incumbents decision to invest, the optimal entry
decision and the optimal retail tari¤s function;
(E4) the investment decision maximizes the incumbents prots, given the access tari¤ for
the old network, the optimal access tari¤ function for the new network, the optimal entry
decision and the optimal retail tari¤s function;
(E5) the access tari¤ for the old network maximizes social welfare, given the optimal in-
vestment decision, the optimal access tari¤ function for the new network, the optimal entry
decision and the optimal retail tari¤s function.
3 Equilibrium
In this Section, we characterize the equilibrium of the game, which we construct by
working backwards.
3.1 Retail Price Stage
We characterize the equilibrium of the retail price game for ve cases: (i) the incumbent
does not invest in the new network, and the entrant exits the market, (ii) the incumbent
5For each consumer served by the entrant the incumbent earns v (z +   pe), i.e., the wholesale
markup times the number of minutes sold to each consumer. This represents the opportunity cost for the
incumbent of serving directly each consumer.
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invests in the new network, and the entrant exits the market (iii) the incumbent does not
invest in the new network, and the entrant stays in the market, (iv) the incumbent invests
in the new network, the entrant stays in the market, and selects the old network, and (v)
the incumbent invests in the new network, the entrant stays in the market, and selects the
new network. In cases (i)-(ii) the retail market is a monopoly. In cases (iii)-(v) the retail
market is a duopoly. We use superscripts mo, mn, do, db, dn to denote variables or functions
associated with cases (i)-(v), respectively. In what follows we use the expression "net" as a
shorthand for "net of the investment cost".
We start with the following Lemma.
Lemma 1: In equilibrium, rms set the marginal price of the two-part retail tari¤ at mar-
ginal cost, i.e., pi = 0 and pe = v, v = o; n. 
As usual with two-part tari¤s, rms set the variable part of the retail tari¤ at marginal
cost to maximize the gross consumer surplus, and then try to extract this surplus using the
xed part.
Given Lemma 1, from now on we only discuss the determination of the xed fees.
3.1.1 Monopoly
Next, we characterize the equilibria of the retail game for the two cases where the retail
market is a monopoly, which is given by the next Lemma.
Lemma 2: If the retail market is a monopoly, in equilibrium, the incumbent charges the
xed fee, for  = n; o:
Fmvi (z;v) =
(z +v)
2
2
  t: (3)

The net prots of the incumbent for  = n; o, are:
mvi (z;v) =
(z +v)
2
2
  t. (4)
3.1.2 Duopoly
Next, we characterize the equilibria of the retail price game for the three cases where the
retail market is a duopoly, which is given by the next Lemma.
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Let D := (i  e) (2z +i +e). Parameter D measures the incumbents quality
advantage with respect to the entrant.6
Lemma 3: If the retail market is a duopoly, in equilibrium, the incumbent and the
entrant charge xed fees, for j = o; b; n:
F
dj
i (i;e; ; z) =
8<: t+ 16 [6 (z +e)  5] + 16D (z +e)  122   t+ 12D
for  on

0;
p
6t D

for  on
p
6t D; z +e

F dje (i;e; ; z) =
8<: t  162   16Dj0 for  on

0;
p
6t D

for  on
p
6t D; z +e

:

The net prots of the incumbent and the entrant, gross of the xed component of the
access tari¤, for j = o; b; n, are, respectively:

dj
i (i;e; ; z) =
8<:
(36t2+4 60t2)+72t(z+e)+D(12t+D+22)
72t
 (z +e)  122   t+ 12D
for  on

0;
p
6t D

for  on
p
6t D; z +e

and
dje (i;e; ; z) =
8<: 172t [6t  (D + 2)]
2
0
for  on

0;
p
6t D

for  on
p
6t D; z +e

In a duopoly, the prot of the incumbent is non-decreasing in the marginal access price,
while the prot of the entrant is non-increasing in the marginal access price.7 When the
marginal access price increases, the marginal cost of the entrant increases relative to that of
the incumbent. As a consequence, the market share, and thereby the prot of the incumbent
increases, while the entrants prot decreases.
3.2 Network Choice Stage
Next, we analyze the entrants decision of which network to use.
6Clearly, in case dj = do we have i = e = 0, in case dj = dn we have i = e = z, and in case
dj = db we have i = z and e = 0. Hence, in cases dj = do and dj = dn we have D = 0, and in case
dj = db we have D = . For simplicity we omit the superscript dj in D; i and e.
7The rst part follows from the assumption that z belongs to
 
4
3
p
6t;+1.
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Lemma 4: (i) Let there be no investment. The entrant:8<: accepts oexits for o on

0;
p
6t

for o on
p
6t;+1 .
(ii) Let there be investment, and let the innovation be drastic, i.e., let  be on [6t;+1).
The entrant: 8<: accepts nexits for (o; n) on [0;+1)

0;
p
6t

for (o; n) on [0;+1)
p
6t;+1 .
(iii) Let there be investment, and let the innovation be non-drastic, i.e., let  be on
[0; 6t). The entrant:8>>>>><>>>>>:
accepts n
accepts n
accepts o
exits
for (o; n) on

0;
p
6t   h0;p2o + 
for (o; n) on
p
6t  ;+1 0;p6t
for (o; n) on

0;
p
6t   hp2o + ;+1
for (o; n) on
p
6t  ;+1 p6t;+1 .

If there is investment and the innovation is drastic, the entrant, when using the old
network, cannot compete against the incumbent, using the new network. Thus, cases (i)
and (ii) are similar in the sense that there are only two viable alternatives for the entrant:
accepting access to the same network that the incumbent is using, or exiting the market. In
case (i) the entrants decision depends only on the regulators choice of o, whereas in case
(ii) it is the incumbents choice of n that is relevant for the entrants decision. The entrant
either uses the same network as the incumbent, if the access price is not too high, i.e., if v
is on

0;
p
6t

, or exits the market.
Case (iii) presents a third alternative for the entrant if o is su¢ ciently low and n is
su¢ ciently high: accepting access to the old network when the incumbent is using the new
one.
3.3 Access Price O¤er Stage
Next, we characterize the incumbents equilibrium access price o¤er, which is presented
in the next Lemma. Denote by n(o), the optimal value of the access price to the new
network, given o.
10
Lemma 5: (i) Let the innovation be drastic, i.e., let  be on [6t;+1). In equilibrium,
the incumbent o¤ers: n(o) =
p
6t, for all o on [0;+1). (ii) Let the innovation be
non-drastic, i.e., let  be on [0; 6t). In equilibrium, the incumbent o¤ers:
n(o) =
8<:
p
2o + p
6t
for o on

0;
p
6t  
for o on
p
6t  ;+1 .

If the innovation is drastic, the entrant, using the old network, cannot compete against
the incumbent, using the new network. Thus, the incumbent o¤ers a unacceptably high
access price, i.e., n(o) =
p
6t, to induce the entrant to exit, and thereby become a
monopolist. The same happens when the innovation is non-drastic, but the access price to
the old network is high enough.
If the innovation is non-drastic and the access price to the old network is low, the entrant,
using the old network, can compete against the incumbent, using the new network. Thus,
since the incumbent cannot avoid competition from the entrant, it prefers to o¤er also a low
access price to the new network. Conceding access to the new network allows the entrant to
increase the quality of its product, and has two opposing e¤ects on the incumbents prot.
First, it has the negative e¤ect of reducing the retail prots of the incumbent: the retail
e¤ect. Second, it has the positive e¤ect of increasing the wholesale prots of the incumbent:
the wholesale e¤ect. To understand this last e¤ect note that, if the entrant uses the new
network, it produces a higher quality product, and thereby earns higher prots. This allows
the incumbent to charge a higher access price, which increases wholesale prots. The latter
e¤ect dominates.8
[Figure 1]
Figure 1 illustrates the entrants equilibrium network choices as well as incumbents
access price o¤ers.
3.4 Investment Stage
Next, we analyze the incumbents decision to invest in the new network.
8This happens because the market is covered, and therefore, all consumers that the entrant captures are
lost by the incumbent. If the market was partially covered, the incumbent would benet additionally from
the entrants consumers that would otherwise be out of the market.
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For (o;z; z) on

0;
p
6t   0;pz2 + 6t  z  4
3
p
6t;+1, denote by
i(o;z; z) := 
dn
i (z;z; 

n(o); z)  doi (0; 0; o; z) ; (5)
the incumbents incremental prot from the investment, given that in stage 3 it o¤ers an
access price n(o).
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The next auxiliary Remark states some useful properties of function i().
Remark 1: Let values z1 and z2 be such that 43
p
6t < z1 < z2 < +1. Function i() :10
(i) is quasi-convex with respect to o, and takes values below 12, if and only if, z is on 
4
3
p
6t; z1

;11
(ii) is strictly decreasing with respect to o, and takes values below 12, if and only if, z
is on (z1; z2);
(iii) is strictly decreasing with respect to o, and never takes values below 12, if and
only if, z is on (z2;+1). 
The following Lemma characterizes the optimal investment decision.
Lemma 6: (i) Let the innovation be drastic, i.e., let  be on [6t;+1). The incumbent
invests for all o on [0;+1). (ii) Let the innovation be non-drastic, i.e., let  be on [0; 6t).
The incumbent:8>><>>:
invests
does not invest
for (o; I) on
p
6t  ;+1 0; 1
2


[ 0;p6t   [0;i(o;z; z))
for (o; I) on

0;
p
6t   i(o;z; z); 12 .

If the innovation is drastic, the incumbent always invests. This allows it to foreclose the
market, and thus obtain a monopoly position.
Given our assumptions regarding I, the incumbent invests for any (I; o), if z is suf-
ciently high, i.e., if z is on (z2;+1). If z is high, the investment option becomes more
protable, given that the increase in the access price received by the incumbent when it
9Recall that z on

0;
p
z2 + 6t  z is equivalent to  on [0; 6t).
10Thresholds z1 and z2 are functions of (t; ). The functional forms of z1 and z2 are presented in the
Appendix.
11Note that this is impossible for  > 0:428t:
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invests extends to a larger number of units. However, for lower values of z, if the innovation
is non-drastic, and o is on

0;
p
6t  , the incumbent may not always nd it protable
to invest.
An interesting implication of the properties of i() presented in Remark 1 is that the
decision to invest may not be monotonic in o. Let z be on (z1; z2). For o on

0;
p
6t  ,
increasing o makes the no-investment decision more protable, and hence discourages in-
vestment. For a su¢ ciently high o the incumbent will prefer not to invest for some values
of I. However, for o on
p
6t  ;+1, the entrants marginal cost is so large that it will
not be able to compete with the incumbent, if the incumbent invests. This happens because
in addition to the marginal cost disadvantage, the entrant will also sell an inferior service.
For the same values of I, the incumbent will then invest and become a monopolist.
Furthermore, for z on
 
4
3
p
6t; z1

, the decision to invest is not monotonic in o, even for
values of the access price for which investing does not foreclose the market. Increasing o
may make the incumbent switch from an investment decision to a no-investment decision,
but the opposite may also occur. Take, for instance, the limit case of o = 0. Then, as
@n
@o

o=0
= 0, a small increase in o does not change the incumbents prot when there is
investment and access is granted at n(o). However, the incumbents prot when there is
no-investment increases with o, given our assumption on z. Therefore, for small values of
o, a small increase in the regulated access price decreases the incentives to invest.
As @

n
@o

o>0
< 1, an increase in o always leads to a smaller increase in n(o). But,
since n() is convex in o, the increase in n() gets closer to the increase in o the higher
o is, and thus the e¤ect of a lower increase in n becomes weaker for higher values of o.
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Additionally, as the investment increases the number of units purchased by each consumer,
an increase in n() a¤ects a larger number of units than the increase in o. This may
increase the incentives to invest.
3.5 Regulation of the Old Network Stage
Next, we discuss the regulators choice of the access price to the old network.
The next Remark presents the regulators objective function.
Remark 2:
12A lower value of z also makes @

n
@o

o>0
closer to 1.
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(I) Welfare: (i) under monopoly is given by:
Wmv (v; z) =
(z +v)
2
2
  1
2
t  v
z
I: (6)
(ii) under duopoly with both rms using network v = o; n, is given by:
W dv (v;v; v; z) =
8<:
72t(z+v)
2+54v 36t(t+2v)
144t
  v
z
I
(z+v)
2
2
  1
2
t  v
z
I
for v on

0;
p
6t

for v on
p
6t; z +v

:
(II) Function W dv() is decreasing in v for v on

0;
q
18
5
t

, and increasing in v for
v on
q
18
5
t;
p
6t

. 
[Figure 1]
Figure 1 illustrates the welfare function, W dv ().13 Function W dv () is quasi-convex in
v because increasing v has the following three e¤ects. First, it has the negative e¤ect of
increasing transportation costs. Second, it has the negative e¤ect of leading the entrant to
set higher marginal retail price. Third, it has the positive e¤ect of making some consumers
shift from the entrant, where they have face a higher marginal retail price, to the incumbent,
where they face a lower marginal retail price. If the access price is zero, the third e¤ect is
absent because the marginal price set by both rms is equal. Thus, increasing v unambigu-
ously lowers welfare. If v is su¢ ciently high, the third e¤ect may more than compensate
the other two.
For a given , investment may shift the welfare function upwards or downwards. This
occurs because
W dn (z;z; ; z) W do (0; 0; ; z) =Wmn (z; z) Wmo (0; z) = 
2
  I;
may be positive or negative. However, for investment to occur the regulator may need to
change the value of .
The regulators only instrument, o, a¤ects welfare in two di¤erent ways. If innovation
is non-drastic and there is investment, the regulators choice of o a¤ects welfare, since n()
is increasing in o. Furthermore, if z is on
 
4
3
p
6t; z2

, the decision to invest may depend on
o, and thus the regulator can use o to a¤ect the investment decision as well as the access
price.
13The welfare function, W dv () is quasi-convex in v. Additionally, W dv

v;
q
6t
5 ; I) =
W dv
 
v;
p
6t; I

=Wmv (v; I), and W dv (v; 0; I) > Wmv (v; I).
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If both rms use the same network and the entrant pays access price v, duopoly is
socially preferable to monopoly, if and only if, v is on
h
0;
q
6
5
t

because:
W dv (v;v; v; z) Wmv (v; z) = (6t  
2
v) (6t  52v)
144t
:
This occurs due to the following trade-o¤: monopoly leads to higher transportation costs,
while, in duopoly, consumers served by the entrant purchase a suboptimal quantity if the
marginal access price exceeds the marginal cost. Thus, if the network in use is the old
network, the regulator prefers a duopoly if o is on
h
0;
q
6
5
t

. If the network in use is the
new network, the regulator prefers a duopoly if n(o) is on
h
0;
q
6
5
t

, or equivalently, if o
is on
h
0;
q
6
5
t  

.
The next Lemma characterizes the socially optimal access price to the old network.
Lemma 7: (i) Let the innovation be drastic, i.e., let  be on [6t;+1). In equilibrium, the
regulator sets o on [0;+1). (ii) Let the innovation be non-drastic, i.e., let  be on [0; 6t).
In equilibrium, the regulator sets:
o =
8<: 0p6t for  on

0; 6
5
t

for  on

6
5
t; 6t

.

If the innovation is drastic, the access price for the old network is irrelevant. From Lemma
6, the incumbent invests, for all o, and thereby the entrant exits the market, independently
of the access price to the old network that the regulator sets.
If the innovation is drastic, for low values of , the regulator sets an o that leads to
duopoly, while for high values of , the regulator sets an o that leads to a monopoly.
3.6 Equilibrium of the Whole Game
Having solved all the ve stages of the commitment game, we can now summarize the
equilibrium of the whole game, which we present in the next Proposition for further reference.
Proposition 1:
(I) If  is on

0; 6
5
t

: (i) the regulator sets o = 0, (ii) the incumbent invests, (iii)
the incumbent o¤ers n =
p
, (iv) the entrant accepts this o¤er, and (v) the incumbent
and the entrant set F dni
 
v;v;
p
; z

and F dne
 
v;v;
p
; z

; respectively:
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(II) If  is on

6
5
t; 6t

: (i) the regulator sets o =
p
6t, (ii) the incumbent invests, (iii)
the incumbent o¤ers n =
p
6t, (iv) the entrant exits the market, and (v) the incumbent
sets Fmni (z;z) =
(z+z)
2
2
  t:
(III) If  is on [6t;+1), (i) the regulator sets any o on [0;+1), (ii) the incumbent
invests, (iii) the incumbent o¤ers n =
p
6t, (iv) the entrant exits the market, and (v) the
incumbent sets Fmni (z;z) =
(z+z)
2
2
  t: 
Case (III) is simple to discuss. With a drastic innovation, the entrant cannot compete
with the incumbent even with access to the old network at o = 0. As the incumbent is free
to choose any access price to the new network, it will set a prohibitively high price, thus
foreclosing the market. With access price as its only regulatory instrument, the regulator
cannot change this outcome and any access price may be observed in equilibrium.
On the contrary, for a non-drastic innovation the regulators choice of o will have an
impact on the nal market structure. The regulator may induce a duopoly by setting a low
access price, or may induce a monopoly by setting a high access price. And both may be
optimal.
On the one hand, a duopoly results in lower average transportation costs but, on the
other hand, consumers served by the entrant will purchase less. This occurs because rms
set two-part retail tari¤s, with marginal price equal to marginal cost. If the access price
is above marginal cost, those consumers served by the entrant will consume a suboptimal
output. Whether duopoly fares better or worse than monopoly, depends on the magnitude
of the price of access to the new network. If z is high but still within the limits of a
non-drastic innovation the incumbent sets a high access price because n() is increasing
in z: the access price to the new network is higher, the higher the increase in quality
enabled by the new network. Therefore, if z is low, a duopoly on the new network is
socially preferable to a monopoly on the same network. If z is high, a monopoly on the
new network is socially preferable to a duopoly on this network. This may be interpreted
as a regulatory moratorium.
Interestingly, for a non-drastic innovation, we obtain the result that when the quality of
the new network is high, the equilibrium access price to the old network is also high. One
might expect precisely the opposite, i.e., expect that when the social value of the innovation
is high, setting a low access price to the old network is required to give the incumbent
incentive to invest. In our case, a high access price would work in the same way, allowing
the incumbent to foreclose the market by investing, and thus giving incentive to invest.
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However, this is not the justication for the regulatory moratorium, as the incumbent would
also invest with o = 0.
4 Extension
In this section, we consider the possibility of both rms investing in the new network.
Consider the model of Section 2, except that: in stage 2 both the incumbent and the
entrant decide whether to invest, in stage 3, if only one rm invested it makes an access
price o¤er to the rival, in stage 4, if one of the rms did not invest it chooses which network
to use. We assume that the entrant and the incumbent have the same investment cost, and
that the innovation is non-drastic.14
We start by solving the equilibrium of the game for a given o. Later, we discuss the
impact on welfare of both rms investing.
If only the incumbent invests, the payo¤s are the same as in Section 3.
If only the entrant invests, its net prot equals dni (z;z; n; z), while the incumbents
net prot equals dne (z;z; n; z). By the same reasoning as in Lemma 4, if only the
entrant invests, it sets access price n (0) =
p
.
If both rms invest, the net prots are dni (z;z; 0; z) for both rm, as this case is
similar to a situation where a rm gives access to the other one at n = 0.
For (o;z; z) on

0;
p
6t   0;pz2 + 6t  z  4
3
p
6t;+1, denote by
ejI(z; o; z) := 
dn
i (z;z; 0; z)  dne (z;z; n (o) ; z) :
the entrants incremental prot from the investment, given that the incumbent invested.
The following Lemma presents the equilibria of the investment game.15
Lemma 8: In equilibrium:
(i) both rms invest, if and only if, I is on

0;ejI(z; 0; z)

;
(ii) the entrant invests and the incumbent does not, if and only if, I is on

ejI(z; 0; z);+1

.
(iii) the incumbent invests and the entrant does not, if and only if, I is on:8<:

ejI(z; o; z);i(z; o; z)

dni (z;z; 0; z) ;+1
 for o on 0;p6t  
for o on
p
6t  ;+1 .
14If the innovation is drastic, the regulator cannot inuence the outcome of the game.
15It can be showed that, for any o; we have ejI(z; 0; z) < i(z; o; z):
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This Lemma suggests the following remarks. First, if the investment cost is low, both
rms invest. Second, if both rms invest, the equilibrium is unique. Otherwise, it is possible
to have two equilibria, one where only the entrant invests, and another where only the
incumbent invests. Third, given that only one rm invests, it is more likely that it is the
incumbent who invests. This happens because the incumbent pays a lower access price
when it asks for access to the rivals network than the entrant, given that it has using the
old network as an outside option. Hence, its incentives to invest, given that the entrant
has invested, are relatively smaller than the entrants incentives to invest, given that the
incumbent has invested.
Figure 3 represents in the (o; I) space all the relevant thresholds for I, in Lemma 8.16
[Figure 3]
Next we discuss how the possibility of investment by the entrant a¤ects welfare when
the regulator sets o optimally.
Suppose that I is on

ejI(z; 0; z);+1

. Since the investment cost is high, in equilib-
rium only one rm invests. There are two cases of interest,  on

0; 6
5
t

and  on
 
6
5
t;+1.
First, let  be on

0; 6
5
t

. If only the incumbent is able to invest, then, from Proposition 1,
it invests, o¤ers n =
p
, and the entrant accepts. If both rms are able to invest and in
equilibrium only the entrant invests, there will be a duopoly with n (0) =
p
. In addition,
if both rms are able to invest and in equilibrium the incumbent invests, there will be either
a duopoly with n (o) =
p
+ 2o, if o is on

0;
p
6t  ; or a monopoly, if o is onp
6t  ;+1. Given that  is on 0; 6
5
t

; welfare under duopoly at access price n =
p

is no smaller than at access price n (o) =
p
+ 2o, or than under monopoly.
17 Now let
 be on
 
6
5
t;+1. If only the incumbent is able to invest, it invests, o¤ers n = p6t, and
becomes a monopolist. If both rms are able to invest, the possible equilibria are as above.
With  on
 
6
5
t;+1, welfare under monopoly with n = p6t exceeds welfare under duopoly
at n =
p
 or n (o) =
p
+ 2o.
Hence, independently of the regulators choice of o, welfare cannot increase when both
rms are able to invest if costs are so high that only one rm will invest in equilibrium. The
16Figure 3 refers to z on
 
4
3
p
6t; z2

. For z on (z2;+1) the Figure is similar but without i(o;z; z).
17Setting o = 0 is a su¢ cient condition for the expected welfare to be the same when only the incumbent
is able to invest or when both rms are able to invest. Therefore, o = 0 is the socially optimal access price
if  is on

0; 65 t

.
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explanation is the following. For  on

0; 6
5
t

it follows from Proposition 1 that there will be
a duopoly with a low access price when the incumbent is the only rm able to invest. When
both rms are able to invest, access price o = 0 leads to the same result, regardless of who
invests. For  on
 
6
5
t;+1, it follows from Proposition 1 that there will be a monopoly
when the incumbent is the only rm able to invest. If the entrant invests it provides access
to the incumbent, and the market structure is a duopoly, whereas if the incumbent invests
there may be a monopoly. Interestingly, as the welfare function is quasi-convex, if  is on 
6
5
t;+1, a monopoly leads to a higher welfare than a duopoly on the new network with
n on
 p
;+1. Therefore, investment by the entrant may reduce welfare.
Suppose that I is on

0;ejI(z; 0; z)

. Since the investment cost is low, in equilibrium
both rms will invest. Thus, welfare is independent of o. For  on

0; 6
5
t

, welfare increases,
if and only if, W dn (z;z; 0; z)  W dn (z;z; n (0) ; z) > I, which is always true. For
 on

6
5
t;+1, welfare increases, if and only if, W dn (z;z; 0; z)  Wmn (z; z) > I, or
equivalently, I < 1
4
t: Thus, if both rms are able to invest, instead of just the incumbent,
welfare may increase or decrease. This stems from the trade-o¤ between access to the new
network being priced at marginal cost for both rms, and the duplication of the investment
cost.
We summarize the previous discussion in the next Remark.
Remark 3: Suppose that both rms can invest. (i) Let I be on

ejI(z; 0; z);+1

,
such that in equilibrium only one rm invests. Welfare does not increase compared with the
case where only the incumbent invests. (ii) Let I be on

0;ejI(z; 0; z);+1

, such that
in equilibrium both rms invest. Welfare may increase or decrease compared with the case
where only the incumbent can invest. 
5 Conclusions
In this article, we analyzed the incentives of a telecommunications incumbent to invest
and give access to a downstream entrant to a next generation network. We distinguished
between the cases of a drastic and non-drastic innovation. If the innovation is drastic, the
incumbent always invests, but does not give access to the entrant. If the innovation is non-
drastic, the regulator can control, through the regulation of the old network, whether the
incumbent (i) invests in a NGN, and (ii) gives access to the network. If the innovation is
non-drastic and if the access price to the old network is low, the incumbent voluntarily gives
19
access to the new network. If the innovation is non-drastic, there is no monotonic relation
between the access price to the old network and the incumbents incentives to invest. A
regulatory moratorium emerges as socially optimal, if innovation is large but non-drastic.
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Appendix
Lemma 1: See DeGraba and Biglaiser. 
Lemma 2: Consumers purchase from the monopolist if and only if
(z +v)
2
2
  tx  Fi > 0,  <  1
t

Fi   1
2
(z +v)
2

Assuming an interior solution, the prot maximizing price is:
Fi =
1
4
(z +v)
2 :
However, we do not have an interior solution since, given our assumption on z,
x =
1
4t
(z +v)
2 > 1, z +v > 2
p
t:
In this case, the optimal xed fee and prots are:
Fmvi = 
mv
i =
(z +v)
2
2
  t:

Lemma 3: To avoid a multiplicity of cases, we assume that rm j = i; e faces demand
yj = (z +j)  pj with j on f0;zg. Additionally, the entrant has costs v on fo; ng,
with max fo; ng < z + e. We start by nding the consumer who is indi¤erent between
buying from the incumbent or from the entrant:
(z +i)
2
2
  tx  Fi = (z +e   )
2
2
  t(1  )  Fe ,
x =
1
2
  Fi   Fe
2t
  (z   +e)
2   (z +i)2
4t
;
with  < z:
The demand function, in terms of consumers, facing the incumbent is
Di =
8>><>>:
0
1
x (Fi; Fe;i;e; ; z)
Fi > Fe +
(2(z+e) )+D
2
+ t
Fi < Fe +
(2(z+e) )+D
2
  t
else
:
Clearly, De = 1 Di.
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Given this indi¤erent consumer, and the fact that pi = 0 and pe = , prot functions,
excluding investment costs, become:
i = Fix (Fi; Fe;i;e; ; z) +  (z +e   ) (1  x (Fi; Fe;i;e; ; z))
e = Fe(1  x (Fi; Fe;i;e; ; z)):
Maximizing each prot function with respect to the xed fee, we nd:
F dvi = t+
1
6
 (6 (z +e)  5) + 1
6
D
F dve = t 
1
6
2   1
6
D:
The indi¤erent consumer is given by
x =
1
2
+
1
12t
 
D + 
2

;
with  <
p
6t D:
We now have to ensure that all consumers have a positive surplus, independently of the
market structure considered:
(z +i)
2
2
  tx (i;e; ; z)  F i (i;e; ; z) > 0,
6t+D + 4 (z +e)  2 (z +i)2   32 < 0:
When both rms use the same network it must be that 6t+4 (z +i)  2 (z +i)2 
32 < 0 for all  <
p
6t. This expression is maximized when  = 2
3
(z +i) at 6t  
2
3
(z +i)
2 if (z +i) < 32
p
6t: If (z +i) > 32
p
6t the maximum is  2((z +i)  
p
6t)2
obtained at  =
p
6t: Hence, we must have 6t   2
3
(z +i)
2 < 0 , (z +i) > 3
p
t if
(z +i) <
3
2
p
6t.
When the entrant uses the old and the incumbent uses the new network we must have
6t + 4zo   2z2   32o  z (2z +z) < 0 for all o <
p
6t z (2z +z): This function
takes maximum value, 6t   2
3
z2  z (2z +z) ; at o = 23z if z < 32
p
6t: If z > 3
2
p
6t; the
maximum is  2(z p6t)2 z (2z +z). Hence, it must be that 6t  23z2 z (2z +z) <
0, z > 1
2
p
3
p
12t+2z   32z for z < 32
p
6t: As
q
9t+ 3
4
2z   32z < 3
p
t z < 3
p
t all
restrictions are veried for z > 3
p
t:
We now show that the incumbents prot function, i (i;e; ; z) ; increases in  for
all  <
p
6t D:
First note that
@(di (i;e;;z))
@
= 1
18t
(18t (z +e) +  (D   30t) + 3), @(
d
i (i;e;;z))
@

=0
=
(z +e) > 0 and
@2(di (i;e;;z))
@2
= 1
18t
(D + 3
2   30t) < 0: Thus, the incumbents prot
increases with  if
@(di (i;e;;z))
@

=
p
6t D
> 0.
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Additionally,
@
0@ @(di (i;e;;z))
@

=
p
6t D
1A
@D
= 2
3
1p
6t D > 0: Hence,
@(di (i;e;;z))
@
> 0 for
all  <
p
6t D if 118t

18t (z +e) +
p
6t  0 (0  30t) + (6t  0) 32

> 0 , z + e >
4
3
p
6t; which is true given our assumption on z:
When  >
p
6t D the entrant will set Fe = 0. In this case, the incumbents demand
is
Di =
8>><>>:
0
1
x (Fi; Fe;i;e; ; z)
Fi >
(2(z+e) )+D
2
+ t
Fi <
(2(z+e) )+D
2
  t
else
:
The best response is to set Fi = 12t+
1
4
 (4 (z +e)  3) + 14D if x (i;e; ; z) < 1,
which is impossible, or Fi =  (z +e)  122   t+ 12D, otherwise. This Fi is set in order
to induce the consumer located at 1 to choose the incumbent. If   z +e; no consumer
will ever choose the entrant and the incumbent is e¤ectively a monopolist. 
Lemma 4: Consider initially that there is no investment in the new network: If o <
p
6t,
the entrant accepts o; otherwise, it exits the market.
Consider now that there is investment in the new network: The entrant will choose a
given network if it results in positive prots and if it is more protable than choosing the
other one. Hence, it will choose the new network if and only if n <
p
6t and
dne (z;z; n; z)  dbe (z; 0; o; z),
1
72t
 
6t  2n
2  1
72t
 
6t  2o   
2 ,
n 
p
2o + :
(i) Assume o <
p
6t  : This means that accepting o results in a positive market
share for the entrant. Then, if n <
p
2o + ; the entrant accepts n; if n >
p
2o + ; it
accepts o:
(ii) Assume that o >
p
6t  : This means that accepting o does not result in a positive
market share for the entrant: Then, if n <
p
6t, the entrant accepts n; if n >
p
6t, it
exits the market.
If 6t   < 0 the entrant would have a non-positive market for any o  0. 
Lemma 5: Assume initially that o <
p
6t  : We start by nding out the best o¤er for
n in the incumbents perspective that is accepted by the entrant. This is the solution to
max
n
dni (z;z; n; z) ;
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subject to n <
p
2o + :
Therefore, the problem is to:
max
n
 
36t2 + 4n   60t2n

+ 72nt (z +z) ;
with rst-order conditions 3n   30tn + 18t (z +z) = 0: Note that evaluated at n = 0
the derivative is positive and that the second derivative 12 (2n   10t) is always negative,
in the relevant range given that n <
p
2o +  <
p
6t. Thus, there are two candidates for
optimum, depending on whether the constraint is binding or not.
The constraint is binding if
h(o) :=
 
2o + 
 3
2   30t  2o +  12 + 18t (z +z) > 0: (7)
As @h(o)
@o
=
3(2o+ 10t)op
+2o
< 0, a high o makes it more likely that the constraint is
not binding. However, h
 p
6t   =  (z +z)  43p6t 18t > 0; given our assumption
that z > 4
3
p
6t. Thus, the constraint is always binding and the optimal access price is
n(o) =
p
+ 2o.
The incumbent will always give access to the new network to the entrant. This happens
because for any o < z we have f(o) > 0, where
f(o) : = 
dn
i

z;z;
p
+ 2o; z

  dbi (z; 0; o; z)
=  

zo +  
p
+ 2o

(z +z)

:
Function f(o) is decreasing in o because
@f(o)
@o

z=0
= 0 and @
2f(o)
@o@z
< 0:
Additionally, f(z) = 0: Hence, for all o < z we have that f(o) > 0.
Assume now that o >
p
6t  . Let us start by nding out the best o¤er n, in the
incumbents perspective, that is accepted by the entrant. This is the solution to
max
n
dni (z;z; n; z) ;
subject to n <
p
6t:
By the same reasons as above, there are two candidates for optimum, depending on
whether the constraint is binding or not.
The constraint is binding if and only if (6t)
3
2   30t (6t) 12 + 18t (z +z) > 0 which is
equivalent to (z +z) > 43
p
6t:Given our assumption on z this always holds. The incumbent
will then prefer that the entrant stays out of the market if and only if
dni

z;z;
p
6t; z

< mni (z;z),
6t+ (z +z)

z +z   2
p
6t

> 0:
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But, as 6t+ (z +z)
 
z +z   2
p
6t

> 6t+ 4
3
p
6t
 
4
3
p
6t  2p6t = 2
3
t > 0 this is always
true. For the same reason, whenever 6t   < 0 the incumbent will prefer that the entrant
stays out of the market. 
Remark 1: With respect toi(o;z; z) = (z +z)
p
2o +  zo  72t (60t    22o) ;
we have that:
i) @
2i(o;z ;z)
@2o
> 0
ii) @
i(o;z ;z)
@o

o=0
=  z < 0
iii) @
i(o;z ;z)
@o

o=
p
6t 
=
18t
p
6t 
p
+z2+
p
6t(
p
6t  18tz)
18t
p
6t
This is positive if and only if z <
p
t
3
p
6  =t+p(=t)2=6  11=t+ 60 :
Additionally, i(
p
6t  ;z; z) < 12 if and only if z <
p
t
72
p
6  =t

(=t+ 84)+p
6 (=t+ 156) (=t+ 12)

:
The two functions z1 and z2 that are helpful for the characterization of i(o;z; z)
are then:
z1 (; t) : =
p
t
3
p
6  =t+
p
(=t)2=6  11=t+ 60

z2 (; t) : =
p
t
72
p
6  =t

(=t+ 84) +
p
6 (=t+ 156) (=t+ 12)

with z2 (; t) > z1 (; t) for all  2 [0; 6t] : 
Lemma 6: (i) Assume that  > 6t: As seen in Lemma 4, the incumbent will not give
access to the new network whatever the access price to the old network, and thus it obtains
monopoly prot in case of investment.
If o <
p
6t, in the absence of investment there will be entry. The incumbent will invest
if and only if:
mni (z;z)  I > doi (0; 0; o; z), mni (z;z)  doi (0; 0; o; z) > I:
As mni (z;z) doi (0; 0; o; z) is decreasing in o, we have that mni (z;z) doi (0; 0; o; z) >
mni (z;z)  doi
 
0; 0;
p
6t; z

= 
2
+
(z 
p
6t)
2
2
> 
2
> I: the incumbent will always invest.
If o >
p
6t, there will be no entry, independently of the investment decision. The
incumbent will invest if and only if:
mni (z;z)  I > moi (z; 0),

2
> I:
which is always true by our assumption on I: Thus, the incumbent will always invest.
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(ii) Assume that  < 6t. Assume that o <
p
6t  : As seen in Lemma 4, the incumbent
will always give access to the new network to the entrant if it invests and it will give access
to the old network if it does not invest. It will be protable to invest if and only if:
dni (z;z; 

n; z)  I > doi (0; 0; o; z), i(o;z; z) > I:
Note that we havei(o; 0; z) = 0 and
@i(o;z ;z)
@z
=
(z+z)(18t(z+z)+3n  30tn)
18tn
+n >
0:
Assume that o >
p
6t  . Then, the incumbent will prefer that the entrant exits if
investment has taken place and this case is equal to (i). 
Remark 2: Note that, @W
d(i;i;;z)
@
= 1
36t
(52   18t) = 0 for  = 0 or  =
q
18
5
t and
that @
2W d(i;i;;z)
@2
= 1
12t
(52   6t) : The second derivative at  = 0 is  1
2
< 0 and at
 =
q
18
5
t <
p
6t it is 1 > 0: The third derivative is always non negative. 
Lemma 7: We start by showing that (i) i(o;z; z) is decreasing until o =
q
6t
5
and
(ii) i(
q
6t
5
;z; z) >

2
:
We have already showed that i(o;z; z) is convex, therefore we just need to show
that the rst derivative at
q
6t
5
is negative: @
i(o;z ;z)
@o

o=
p
6t
5
= 
18t
q
6t
5
 z+p(+ z2) p 6t5q
(+ 65 t)
:
This is positive if
p
(+ z2)
p
6t
5q
(+ 65 t)
> z   
18t
q
6t
5
: As both terms in the inequality are
positive, this implies that
p
(+ z2)
p
6t
5q
(+ 65 t)
2
>

z   
18t
q
6t
5
2
which is equivalent to
6
p
30+5
t
p
30 6p5
p
5
t
+1356
450
< zp
t
<
6
p
30+5
t
p
30+6
p
5
p
5
t
+1356
450
.
As
6
p
30+5
t
p
30+6
p
5
p
5
t
+1356
450
< 6
p
30+30
p
30+6
p
5
p
30+1356
450
< 4
3
p
6, it is impossible to have
@i(o;z ;z)
@o

o=
p
6t
5
> 0:
We now show that i(
q
6t
5
;z; z) >

2
: Let
g() := i(
r
6t
5
;z; z)  
2
=
(5  468t)
360t
  z
r
6
5
t+
 r
6
5
t+ 
!
(z +z)
Assume that g() < 0,
s 
6
5
+ 
t


t
+

zp
t
2
<
(468 5t )t
360
+ zp
t
q
6
5
. As both sides in the
inequality are positive this implies that
 
6
5
+ 
t


t
+

zp
t
2
<

(468 5t )t
360
+ zp
t
q
6
5
2
,
180

zp
t
2
+
 p
30
t
  468
5
p
30

zp
t
+
13(t )
2
2
  621

t
5
  5(

t )
3
144
+ 216 < 0.
Therefore we should have
p
30(468 5t )
1800
 
q
5(5t  108)(5t +6)(5t  828)
1800
< zp
t
<
p
30(468 5t )
1800
+q
5(5t  108)(5t +6)(5t  828)
1800
.
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By plotting these roots as a function of 
t
2 (0; 6) ; we observe that
p
30(468 5t )
1800
+q
5(5t  108)(5t +6)(5t  828)
1800
< 4
3
p
6, meaning that it is impossible to have g() < 0:
This implies that I < 
2
< i(
q
6t
5
;z; z), and thus, duopoly on the old network with
o = (
i)
 1
(I) >
q
6
5
t is worst than monopoly on the old network, which is worst than a
monopoly on the new network.
The regulators choice is thus between duopoly and monopoly on the new network. To
maximize welfare in the case of duopoly, the regulator will set o = 0 leading to n =
p
:
If  < 6
5
t this results in higher welfare than the case of monopoly. However, when  > 6
5
t;
monopoly on the new network is better than duopoly on the new network, and thus the
regulator sets o =
p
6t. 
Proposition 1: This follows from the Lemmas above. 
Lemma 8: We start by showing that (N;N) cannot be an equilibrium of this game because
the entrant will always prefer to invest. A necessary condition for (N;N) to be an equilibrium
is that the entrant prefers not to invest given that the incumbent does not invest. For the
case of o <
p
6t this corresponds to:
doe (0; 0; o; z)  dni (z;z; n(0); z)  I ,
I  dni (z;z; n(0); z)  doe (0; 0; o; z)
Since d
do
e (0;0;o;z)
do
< 0; the minimum of dni (z;z; 

n(0); z)   doe (0; 0; o; z) occurs when
o = 0 at 
dn
i (z;z; 

n(0); z)  doe (0; 0; 0; z) = (
36t2+2 60t)+72pt(z+z)
72t
  1
2
t > 
2
: It can
be showed that this is always true. Additionally, I  dni (z;z; n(0); z)  doe (0; 0; o; z)
implies that I  dni (z;z; n(0); z) : But this is the condition for the entrant to prefer to
invest given that the incumbent does not invest for o >
p
6t.
We will now analyze the other possibilities.
i) (Y; Y ) is an equilibrium if and only if:
dni (z;z; 0; z)  I  dne (z;z; n (0) ; z) (8)
dni (z;z; 0; z)  I  dne (z;z; n (o) ; z) (9)
when o <
p
6t  . As dne (z;z; n (o) ; z)  dne (z;z; n (0) ; z), the two inequali-
ties hold if and only if:
I  ejI(z; 0; z) := dni (z;z; 0; z)  dne (z;z; n (0) ; z)
=
1
2
t  (6t  )
2
72t
=
(12t  )
72t
<

2
:
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Note that, when o >
p
6t  , (9) should be replaced by dni (z;z; 0; z)  I  0. But
this is implied by (9). Hence, (Y; Y ) is an equilibrium if and only if I  ejI(z; 0; z).
ii) (N; Y ) is an equilibrium if and only if I  ejI(z; 0; z): We have already showed
that when the incumbent does not invest the entrant will prefer to invest. Therefore, for
(N; Y ) to be an equilibriumwe need only impose that dni (z;z; 0; z) I  dne (z;z; n (0) ; z)
which is equivalent to I  ejI(z; 0; z).
iii) Consider that o <
p
6t  : (Y;N) is an equilibrium if and only if:
dni (z;z; 

n (o) ; z)  I  doi (0; 0; o; z)
dne (z;z; 

n (o) ; z)  dni (z;z; 0; z)  I
which is equivalent to
I  i(o;z; z) = (z +z)
p
2o +   zo  

72t
 
60t    22o

I  ejI(z; o; z) := dni (z;z; 0; z)  dne (z;z; n (o) ; z) =
1
2
t  (6t    
2
o)
2
72t
Clearly, ejI(z; 0; z) < ejI(z; o; z) and ejI(z; 0; z) < i(o;z; z).18
Inspection of ejI(z; o; z) reveals that this is a continuous increasing function in o
that for o 
p
6t   takes values on the interval ejI(z; 0; z); 12t :
Consider now that
p
6t   < o <
p
6t. (Y;N) is an equilibrium if
mni (z; z)  I  doi (0; 0; o; z)
0  dni (z;z; 0; z)  I
which is equivalent to
I  mni (z; z)  doi (0; 0; o; z) =
1
2
+
1
2
z2   3
2
t  zo + 5
6
2o  
1
72t
4o
I  dni (z;z; 0; z) =
1
2
t
We have already shown that I is always lower than mni (z; z)   doi (0; 0; o; z). Thus,
(Y;N) is an equilibrium if and only if I  1
2
t.
Consider now that o >
p
6t. (Y;N) is an equilibrium if
mni (z; z)  I  moi (0; z)
0  dni (z;z; 0; z)  I
18ejI(z; 0; z)   i(o;z; z) =  (+
2
o)
36t + zo +   
p
+ 2o

(z +z). It is impossi-
ble that zo +   
p
+ 2o

(z +z) > 0. This is equivalent to
zo+
(z+z)
>
p
+ 2o: This im-
plies, by squaring both sides of the inequality, that

zo+
(z+z)
2
   + 2o > 0. Simplifying we obtain
  (z +z) 2 (2z +z) (o   z)2z > 0 which is false. Hence, ejI(z; 0; z) i(o;z; z) < 0.
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which is equivalent to
I  mni (z; z)  moi (0; z) =
(z +z)
2
2
  t  (z + 0)
2
2
+ t =

2
I  dni (z;z; 0; z) =
1
2
t
The rst condition always holds. Thus, (Y;N) is an equilibrium if and only if I  1
2
t. 
Remark 3: This follows from Proposition 1 and Lemma 8. 
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Figures
The entrants decision to select the old or new network and the incumbents choice of n:
Welfare as a function of the access price.
Equilibria when both rms may invest in the (o; I) space.
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